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Business process re-engineering (BPR) has come to 
recognize a need for the adoption of socio-technical 
methodologies and capabilities for knowledge 
representation of qualitative concerns.  Security planning 
and decision-making has a similar need, and furthermore 
socio-technical methods common to BPR can be usefully 
applied in this capacity. 
 
The introduction of security models like Defense-in-
Depth and similar efforts to recognize the organizational 
impact of security planning in operational security 
management serve as an initial step in educating security 
personnel and provide a more comprehensive view, but 
unfortunately, security decision-making has traditionally 
relied almost solely upon quantitative risk assessment, 
cost/benefit mechanisms, and related, functionalistic 
methodologies.  This greatly limits the representational 
capacity of the decision process, and with it the possible 
dimensions of analysis in which to consider security 
issues. 
 
Within this paper, we briefly examine security planning 
and the relevant techniques of BPR and Socio-technical 
design, and present a framework for their integration 
within the context of information security. It is our 
contention that such methodologies can be utilized in the 
security decision process to facilitate representation of 
subjective concerns and broadly-defined issues germane 
to security policy, within an organizational context. 
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The shift towards a more holistic view of information 
security as an organizational concern would necessitate 
security management methodologies capable of 
incorporating and representing a broader perspective than 
has been the case [1].  Such a shift, in essence 
necessitated by the rapid change of technology and the 
emergence of new organizational structures, has brought 
certain classical assumptions central to traditional 
security theory into question.  Specifically, the 
phenomena of distributed systems and decentralization, 
such as that evidenced by the widespread Peer-to-peer 
(P2P) applications, facilitate radically different 
computing architectures than traditional security 
approaches are designed to account for [2].  Additionally, 
the changes represented by methodologies like business 
process re-engineering (BPR), which advocates 
transformational use of IT [3] and radical restructuring of 
the firm, have fundamentally altered the structures of 
many organizations.  In essence, the majority of the 
assumptions underlying traditional security theory have 
been and are being substantially altered by new 
technologies and process-oriented orientations to 
business. 
 
We note additionally that information systems 
implementation can cause deliberate or unintentional 
modification of business processes [4], and this can result 
in social and psychological repercussions within the 
organization.  In the modern business environment, the 
need exists for access by as well as interaction with 
trusted intranet as well as extranet systems, a need which 
explicitly violates a more traditional closed-system 
conception assumed by the classic security paradigm [5].  
The emerging perspective on such organizations and their 
information systems, operating within such a complex 
environment, must be one of open systems, as defined in 
[6]. 
 
These changes in our awareness of information security 
necessitate new approaches and revisions to our 
awareness of organizational security.  If we truly 
recognize a view which goes beyond the functional 
problems of threat mitigation, we gain an expanded 
perspective for our analysis efforts, and lose nothing in 
return.  Socio-technical methods which are capable of 
representing social context, motives, and emergent 
organizational concerns can be employed in business 
process redesign and reengineering efforts to mitigate the 
effects of radical change and decrease resistance [7].  It is 
our contention that similar methods can and should be 
utilized explicitly in the security decision process to 
facilitate a holistic representation of subjective concerns 
and broadly-defined issues germane to security 
management and planning, within an organizational 
context.  Within this paper, we briefly examine security 
planning and the relevant techniques of BPR and socio-
technical theory, and present a framework for their 
integration within the context of information security. 
 
 
2.  SECURITY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Traditional security methodologies have been 
characterized as functionalistic and even technocratic [8].  
The prevailing paradigm of information security evolved 
under radically different assumptions [5] about both the 
nature of organizations and technology than the modern 
IT environment presents  – large, centralized, dedicated 
computing power (i.e. mainframes) and batch processing, 
strict task-oriented, hierarchal power structures, and 
closed systems.  Early conceptions, inherently 
functionalistic in nature, [9] including the access control 
matrix [10] and [11] models, and the information security 
notions of the so-called “Orange Book” [12] – 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, constituted 
this paradigm [5], with “Confidentiality” as the historical 
focus for information security.  Decentralization and 
web-based technologies, widespread use of redundant and 
fail-over systems, and the growing concern with business 
continuity planning (BCP) in information security 
suggest that Integrity and Availability are increasingly 
coming into greater focus. 
 
Information security awareness is multi-dimensional, 
often non-technical in nature and trans-organizational in 
scope of importance [13].  The controlled governmental 
and business environment’s managed information flow 
from “high” to “low” has historically been essential to the 
preservation of Confidentiality, [9] as the primary 
concern of information security.  However, public 
awareness of security concerns and the publicity accorded 
by the media to potential vulnerabilities across 
organizational barriers to a certain extent violates this 
constraint, again resulting in an open system.  Such 
concerns must inherently affect the security management 
of an organization. 
 
The introduction of security models like Defense-in-
Depth and related efforts by institutions like the 
International Standards Organization (ISO), and 
International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium (ISC)2 to promote information security 
awareness serve as an initial step in educating security 
personnel and provide a more comprehensive and holistic 
view of organizational security. Unfortunately, security 
decision-making and risk assessment has traditionally 
relied almost solely upon the traditional managerial 
techniques of quantitative risk assessment, e.g., 
Actualized Loss Expectancy [14], cost/benefit 
mechanisms, and related methodologies.  We have 
elsewhere argued that truly multi-dimensional security 
planning needs to incorporate qualitative concerns and 
multiple stakeholder perspectives, and to illustrate trade-
offs explicitly in the security decision process [15]. 
 
3.  RE-ENGINEERING AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
METHODS 
 
Business Process Reengineering 
 
Business Process Reengineering (BPR), a methodology 
which achieved wide-scale popularity as a management 
tool in the 1990’s [16, 17], is a process-oriented form of 
organizational redesign which aims at making radical 
changes to an organization to gain large-scale increases in 
productivity.  The methodology involves a holistic 
analysis of the organization oriented around the customer 
processes’ perspective, and the delineation of specific 
inputs and outputs to the various value-creating 
processes.  BPR favors the elimination of bureaucracy as 
a natural consequence of reorganization and 
recombination of tasks and lends itself towards flattening 
power structures [18].  The combination of these qualities 
suggest that BPR techniques may possess high synergy 
with a multidimensional conceptualization of information 
security awareness. 
 
BPR, at its inception, was never claimed by its authors to 
be an original technique, i.e., [16] nor a comprehensive 
methodology.  The originators deliberately refrained from 
constraining the methodology to a systematic collection 
of techniques.  It is thus not altogether surprising that 
BPR has been identified and criticized variously as being 
originally void of a methodology [19], a neo-Taylorist 
movement [17], and a management fad [20].  “Real” BPR 
has come to be characterized as essentially a top-down 
approach to organizational process restructuring intended 
to achieve measurable large-scale performance gains [21] 
by refocusing business processes around process 
customers and reintegrating task-based work into a 
process perspective. 
 
Identified unique characteristics of the movement, 
common between various interpretations are:  
 The consistent notion of its being focused on 
“radical” [22] changes, as opposed to incremental 
improvement methodologies like TQM [16, 23]. 
 The stance taken towards IT as a key enabler of the 
revolutionary change to be wrought through re-
engineering [3]. 
 
BPR has been widely implemented, and in some cases 
used to great success, but high failure rates of 40 to 70 
percent reported by organizations [24] seem to suggest 
that there are deep roots to this problem.  Several BPR 
pioneers themselves hold the primary cause of 
organizational BPR failure to be the lack of accounting 
for the sociopolitical dimension [25, 26]. 
 
Socio-technical Theory and BPR 
 
Socio-technical theory holds that there is inherent 
interdependent relation between people and technology 
[19].  Sociotechnical approaches to systems development 
were pioneered in the 1970’s and 80’s [27], as an 
incorporation of more organizational and behavioral 
approaches to change management.  Conceptualizing an 
organization as a set of business processes bears great 
similarity to notions of a social organization as a 
collection of interacting open systems [7], common to 
Organizational Development (OD) theory. 
 
Why should we concern ourselves with a socio-technical 
“soft-systems” approach at all?  An organization which 
changes the logistics of workflow but fails to facilitate 
change to the organizational realities becomes highly 
susceptible to failure, unexpected delays, worker 
frustration, and even sabotage of the new process [18].  
Resistance to change in general assuredly occurs when 
the resulting situation created by change is perceived as a 
threat to an individual’s security or stability [28]. 
Additionally, installation and implementation of an 
information system can itself result in an unintentional or 
intentional “re-designing” of the business processes in 
which it is embedded [4] as well as reactionary behavior 
as the organization adapts to the change.  Insofar as both 
people and technology are fundamental to the whole of an 
organization, the social and psychological impact of new 
technology and process redesign upon the existing 
sociopolitical climate and organizational roles must be 
taken into account.  This is the fundamental insight which 
socio-technical design offers us. 
 
The incorporation of socio-technical theory into BPR is 
based upon the realization that many of the ideas 
associated with the techniques of BPR – process-based 
thinking, radical change, and transformative use of IT – 
are compatible with socio-technical analysis, when 
divorced from a purely Taylorist bias, such as was 
espoused by some early BPR advocates [29].  Pairing 
these fundamental concepts with the recognition of a 
need for integration between human and technology 
issues in the changes to be wrought [7, 30], we can see 
how a dialogue for the consideration of socio-technical 
design ideas in BPR could be created.  Unfortunately, 
early efforts in this direction minimized the 
organizational political issues or viewed them simply as 
problems standing in the way of implementing effective 
control structures [7].  Socio-technical modeling treats 
these “fuzzy” issues as design requirements not altogether 
different from more objective criteria and goals. 
 
A fundamental need unique to socio-technical modeling 
is the representation of organizational concerns – not 
merely the concerns of engineering the design (what 
occurs in a process, and how can we make it occur), but 
also those of motive (why does it occur in the first 
place?).  Processes, problems and concerns must be seen 
within their social and psychological contexts.  These 
concerns are inherently different from those of 
engineering and design – they are predominantly 
qualitative and subjective issues and perceptions held by 
multiple people within a given organization.  Relevant 
techniques for the explicit inclusion of goal hierarchies in 
business modeling for IS design have been explored, i.e., 
[31], as have social representation frameworks for 
modeling [18] but not specifically in relation to security 
management. 
 
4.  OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATION 
 
Certain commonalities can be seen to exist between the 
areas discussed in the previous sections.  We recognize 
that the commonality of a process-focused perspective 
exists between BPR and socio-technical design.  It 
naturally follows that if it is possible to conceive of a 
security process at all, it should be equally possible to re-
engineer the process thus conceived.  Changing business 
processes requires mutual adaptation by structures, 
processes, people, and technology to accommodate one 
another [32] in the new environment.  This insight 
suggests the possibility of an integrative framework for 
change. 
 
The dilemma faced by information security is this: if we 
accept, a priori, a purely functionalist definition of 
security, we admit essentially that security consists of the 
ascertainment of threats, and the mitigation of these 
threats by the application of various control measures.  
This simplistic notion is not incompatible with socio-
technical theory, nor with any expanded view of security.  
In fact, it illustrates a meta-problem in that by applying a 
control, we are actually changing the nature of the 
security environment, and if we do not take this explicitly 
into account, we simply create a vicious reactionary cycle 
through the process of control implementation.  Figure 1 
presents the basic framework of security management 
based on the key areas: People, Technology, and Process, 










































Figure 1.  A framework of integrating BPR, socio-
technical theory in information security. 
 
We now briefly describe the various components of the 
framework presented.   
 
The foundational components can be defined as follows: 
 People: Within the context of this framework, 
this refers to the individuals within the organization, 
and the formal as well as informal relationships and 
social hierarchies which exist within the 
organization. 
 Technology: We’ve used this broad term to refer to 
the whole of the organizational information 
technology infrastructure.  In security terms, we are 
thus concerned with the IT infrastructure and 
computing environment. 
 Process: This refers to the business processes as 
well as formally-organized hierarchies which exist 
within the organization.  It includes the whole corpus 
of organizational policy and legal agreements as well 
as formal literature, operations manuals, and the like. 
 
At the center of the framework, “Awareness of Threat or 
Control” is a self-explanatory definition, but how it 
impacts the model must be explained.  We are 
considering the perception, or awareness, of a threat (for 
example, a public warning of an upcoming worm, or 
news of an actual security breach within the 
organization), as eliciting a response from each of the 
base components (People, Technology, and Process).  
Similarly, the implementation of a control impacts 
organizational awareness and may have 
social/psychological as well as technical consequences, or 
provoke a managerial response. 
 
We turn next to the three sets of controls: Technological, 
Managerial, and Social/Psychological.   
 Technological controls are well-understood and the 
primary subject of traditional information security – 
physical controls which mitigate against physical 
threats (for example, a network firewall, or even a 
low-tech safe).   
 Managerial controls are the policies and executive 
fiat which can alter the organization’s formal 
political structure.  These controls protect at the legal 
level, and may include, for example, a nondisclosure 
agreement, an access control policy, or a directive for 
a total shutdown.   
 Social/Psychological controls are slightly more 
difficult to define – the idea of such a control 
originates from behavioral control theory.  In 
essence, they comprise the social norms, 
organizational awareness and education, and 
incentive systems which shape and influence but do 
not necessarily compel desired behaviors. 
 
We have included several one-way processes within the 
model that characterize several of the more narrowly 
focused methodologies discussed briefly within this 
paper, namely, 
 
 Taylorism is a one-way flow from Process to People, 
such that organizational restructuring is simply 
imposed upon the existing social organization.   
 Functionalism is next identified as a one-way 
relation, where organizational processes make 
demands on technology without regard for either the 
existing technological infrastructure or concern for 
the effect such implementations on the people within 
the organization.   
 Technocratic bias is described as the imposition of 
technological constraints on the social order without 
concern for its potential repercussions.  
 Transformational use of IT within an organization 
(the innovative utilization of IT as a key part of long-
term strategy) can itself be the cause or inspiration 
for process redefinition based on inherent capabilities 
of the technology. 
 Emergent use of IT is occasioned when social group 
interaction results in innovative use of IT which were 
outside the original intended purpose of that 
technology and expands its utility.  
 
The applied knowledge of Process Re-engineering, 
Socio-technical Theory and Organizational Development 
are represented as bidirectional relationships between the 
foundational components.  Process Re-engineering relates 
Process and Technology, Socio-technical Theory 
connects People and Technology, and Organizational 
Development relates People and Process.  These three 
disciplines form a larger body of knowledge which forms 
the integral framework for security management. 
 
Within this framework, then, knowledge of business 
process re-engineering, socio-technical theory, and 
organizational development become amenable to security 
management as mediators between the three fundamental 
components of People, Technology, and Process.  Ideally, 
this presents a more holistic perspective and broadly 
suggests developed fields of study within the literature 
which can facilitate adherence to this framework.  This is 
certainly not to suggest that any individual might have 
mastery of these various subject matter, only that basic 
concepts and techniques from these areas of knowledge 
could be adapted to facilitate a broader understanding of 
security management in relation to an organization. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper takes a preliminary step towards a truly 
integrated conceptualization of information security 
awareness as a multidimensional concern.  We broadly 
sketch the relevant areas of knowledge which seem 
appropriate and even natural to such an integration and 
discuss briefly the limitations of more specialized and 
focused approaches.  We then present a conceptual 
framework for integration that visually demonstrates the 
relationships implicit between the elements from a 
perspective of security awareness. 
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